Binghamton University

The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
Graduate Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations, Theses and Capstones

5-10-2018

Protocols, awareness, and preparedness of Dominica during
Hurricane Maria: small island developing states' challenges to
resiliency and adaptation to climate change
Keanna Nicole Julien
Binghamton University--SUNY, kjulien1@binghamton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/dissertation_and_theses

Recommended Citation
Julien, Keanna Nicole, "Protocols, awareness, and preparedness of Dominica during Hurricane Maria:
small island developing states' challenges to resiliency and adaptation to climate change" (2018).
Graduate Dissertations and Theses. 64.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/dissertation_and_theses/64

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations, Theses and Capstones at The Open
Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Dissertations and Theses by
an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please
contact ORB@binghamton.edu.

PROTOCOLS, AWARENESS, AND PREPAREDNESS OF DOMINICA DURING
HURRICANE MARIA: SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES’
CHALLENGES TO RESILIENCY AND ADAPTATION
TO CLIMATE CHANGE

BY
KEANNA NICOLE JULIEN
BA, Binghamton University, 2016

THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Science in Sustainable Communities
in the Graduate School of
Binghamton University
State University of New York
2018

Copyright by Keanna Nicole Julien 2018
All Rights Reserved

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Science in Sustainable Communities
in the Graduate School of
Binghamton University
State University of New York
2018
May 10, 2018

Carl Lipo, Chair
Department of Environmental Studies, Binghamton University
Robert Holahan, Faculty Advisor
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University
George Homsy, Faculty Advisor
College of Community and Public Administration, Binghamton University

iii

ABSTRACT
Due to climate change, small island developing states (SIDS) will experience
natural hazards, such as hurricanes, with increased frequency and with greater intensity.
This thesis seeks to provide insight for a case study of SIDS by examining the protocols
used, awareness of the situation, and preparedness of the country of Dominica during the
event of Hurricane Maria in September 2017. The study of this island’s response to this
disaster event serves as an assessment of how well SIDS, particularly those located in the
Caribbean region, can respond and recover. Through fieldwork, I acquired qualitative
data using interviews of local individuals. The results suggest that islands have many
factors that challenge the resilience of island populations. These challenges are rooted in
the historical, environmental, political, social, and economic characteristics of the island.
As a consequence, SIDS will have to address these challenges to emerge as sustainable
communities.
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1 Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 What are Small Island Developing States (SIDS)?
Small island developing states (SIDS) are found around the world, yet these
island communities share many similar characteristics: they are geographically isolated,
have limited resources, and import resources such as food, fossil fuels and other sources
of energy. Typically, SIDS have a high dependency on imports, and low numbers of
exports. There are currently 57 SIDS listed by the United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) and grouped into three regions: (1) the
Caribbean Sea; (2) Pacific Ocean; and (3) the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and
the South China Sea (AIMS) (United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, ).
Island communities often have small populations, though through development
these numbers are often steadily increasing. The overall size of SIDS structures social
networks: small habitable areas often leads to individuals forming close kinship and
bonds with each other (Gaillard, 2007; Kelman, 2015; Méheux, Dominey-Howes, &
Lloyd, 2007a). Their size also means that individuals are closely tied to the availability of
local resources for subsistence. The individuals of these states have an intimate
relationship with the land and the sea, echoed in their livelihoods.
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All SIDS face challenges in susceptibility to natural hazards as well as in
achieving sustainability in their communities. SIDS’ communities are often vulnerable to
tropical cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, some volcanic activity, and storm surges
(Méheux, Dominey-Howes, & Lloyd, 2007b; Mimura et al., 2007) The impacts of natural
hazards are particular problematic for small islands given their limited local resources.
Thus, exposure to natural hazards has the ability to dramatically shape the structure of
communities.

Figure 1 SIDS Map En. Osiris[Map]. (2013, January 2). Retrieved from
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SIDS_map_en.svg

1.2 Literary Review
1.2.1

IPCC predicts high risk of impacts for small islands.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change studies the effects of climate
change and whose published findings influence international governments and
policymakers (Barry & Frankland, 2014; IPCC, 2013). The results of the panel’s findings
show that there is high confidence that climate change will severely impact small islands.
The IPCC suggests that the consequences are so severe that social and political changes
will have to be made to deal with the degree of impacts (Barry & Frankland, 2014). For
2

instance, sea level rise threatens the existence of some SIDS within the region of the
Pacific. The political changes as significant as full evacuations of these states will be
required, socially changing the livelihoods of the islanders (Kelman, 2015).
“Current and future climate-related drivers of risk for small islands during the 21st
century include sea level rise (SLR), tropical and extratropical cyclones, increasing
air and sea surface temperatures, and changing rainfall patterns (high confidence;
robust evidence, high agreement)”.
-

Chapter 29: Small islands. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation,
and Vulnerability. 5th Assessment Report from IPCC (Mimura et al.,
2007)

1.2.2 Local voices provide insight into challenges faced by communities
To reduce impacts, guidelines from other countries such as the United States,
should not be used for SIDS. Islands require policies and governance guidelines that are
specific to their characteristics. Kelman (2010), for example, claims that local voices
within communities provide the best insights into people’s interests, desires, and
perceptions (Kelman, 2010). Kelman argues that island governance towards hazards
should incorporate community-based knowledge for islands’ survival. His argument
stems from the fact that islands, especially those that have indigenous peoples, have used
techniques that have worked, allowing their inhabitants to survive until today. He
acknowledges that climate change carries uncertainties to which traditional local
knowledge alone cannot guarantee survival, but still thinks that it a weapon that is
underutilized.
To reduce impacts, blanket policies from other countries, such as the United
States, should not be used for SIDS. Islands require policies and governance guidelines
that are specific to their characteristics. Kelman (2010), for example, claims that local
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voices within communities provide the best insights into people’s interests, desires, and
perceptions (Kelman, 2010). Kelman argues that island governance towards hazards
should incorporate community-based knowledge in order for islands’ survival. His
argument stems from the fact that islands, especially those that have indigenous peoples,
have used techniques that have worked, allowing their inhabitants to survive until today.
He acknowledges that climate change carries uncertainties to which traditional local
knowledge alone cannot guarantee survival, but still thinks that it a weapon that is
underutilized.
Others agree that research is needed at the community level to obtain local knowledge
and insight. Méheux, Dominic-Howes, and Lloyd (2007) have written about the reasons
that there should be future research of island communities and natural hazards. They
explicitly say that it is a good idea for smaller-scale research – especially at the
community level. They state that larger nations who scientists consider to be more
responsible for the increasing climate change will not focus on research and development
for SIDS because those effects that affect SIDS are not considered a threat to them
(Méheux et al., 2007). This topic joins the fuller discussion about climate justice, which
states that nations responsible for climate change should be the ones that look to reduce
the impacts felt by those who are most vulnerable to climate change. In this case, it is
SIDS (Baptiste & Rhiney, 2016a; Scobie, 2018). Furthermore, these authors believe that
researching the relationship between natural hazards and SIDS can encourage, not only
disaster mitigation, but also sustainable development planning initiatives which can
support island livelihoods. Méheux, Dominic-Howes, and Lloyd’s article (2007) then
conclude with a recommendation of smaller-scale studies, at the community level, which
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identifies impacts from natural hazards, as well as weaknesses in the existing protocols,
but comprehension of best practices of response and recovery of island communities
(Méheux et al., 2007; Scobie, 2018).(Kelman, 2010)(Méheux et al., 2007)(Baptiste &
Rhiney, 2016; Scobie, 2018)(Scobie, 2018)
1.2.2.1 The Components of Emergency Management
The realm of response and recovery is closely related to the operations of
emergency management. Emergency management is the framework that operates to
reduce vulnerability to hazards and reconstruct areas throughout a disaster crisis. It has
four main phases: (1) Mitigation, (2) Preparedness, (3) Response and (4) Recovery.
These four, in addition to communication, are considered disciplines of efficient
emergency management systems widely adopted around the world in moments of
disaster. In relevance to this study, I will review two of these disciplines to understand
the protocols, awareness, and preparedness of my case study area.
1.2.2.1.1 Preparedness
Preparedness is a systematic approach which includes assessing vulnerabilities
and risks of people or places. The assessment part of preparedness identifies shortfalls
that can decrease the capability to respond and recover from hazards or disasters.
Preparedness is manifested by the individual, community, business, governmental, or
non-governmental groups (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017). Actions involved with
preparedness is needed for the survival of economic, social, and ecological systems.
Preparedness assesses the current capability of a community to respond and
recover to emergency situations or disasters. There are four components of preparedness:
planning, training, exercises, and equipment. Planning involves scoping vulnerabilities
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or threats. This scoping provides information about the threat for which one is preparing.
Training involves the education involved with managing oneself and others during a
crisis. Preparing elected officials, emergency managers, and the public require training.
Exercising involves simulations of potentially hazardous events and identifying the
shortfalls that can lead to a decreased chance of surviving the event. These exercises
include drills and full-scale simulations of natural disasters. Equipment consists of the
availability, operating, and upkeep of supplemental components that are deemed to be
useful during an emergency. Equipment includes communicative devices, vehicles, and
scientific instruments.
Most entities have an emergency operation plan that spells out the process for
preparation. For countries, often a national response framework is developed. The plan
includes the base plan, the functional, situational, and hazards annexes (Haddow et al.,
2017). The basic plan is the complete operational guide but, annexes provide more depth
into the responsibilities and roles of each function for each situation or hazard (Goss,
1996).
The public’s preparedness begins with education and training. Community
emergency response teams (CERT) have been successfully developed within the United
States. CERT programs teach people within communities how to take control and help
one another during an emergency situation when official response teams might be
overwhelmed or not able to respond effectively. These programs provide facts about
potential disasters, life-saving and decision-making skills, and how to organize into teams
during an emergency situation(Haddow et al., 2017).

6

1.2.2.1.2 Communication
Communication during an emergency event is important because it enhances the
probability of efficient response and recovery from hazards. “The mission of an effective
disaster communications strategy is to provide timely and accurate information to the
public in all four phases of emergency management…” (Haddow et al., 2017,
p.134)(Haddow et al., 2017). Mitigation are the strategies adopted that can reduce the
loss of lives or properties. Communicating preparedness involves transmitting
information to the public. Response and recovery involve developing warnings and
updates about an ongoing disaster then letting the public know where to get help.
Haddow and colleagues (2017) state that contemporary varieties of media are an
effective way to communicate about hazards and disasters because it allows transparency.
Internet-enabled cell phones, tablets, laptops, and digital cameras allow citizens to the
display the frontline conditions of the emergencies as well as televisions and radios. Due
to the value of media in the context of a disaster, a partnership should be forged between
social media outlets and emergency managers /operators so that information can
efficiently be transmitted to the community. Communication can also be aided by local
networks within the community-based groups that can spread messages along.
One crucial aspect of communication is the messenger chosen to deliver official
messages. The messenger who communicates to the public should be someone who has a
critical role in the disaster response operations to enable public trust in the correct
operation. Elected official and emergency managers must be openly seen by the public so
that all are aware that information is coming from someone who has the authority and can
make decisions (Haddow et al., 2017).

7

1.2.3 Local voices provide insight into challenges faced by communities
To reduce impacts, blanket guidelines from other areas of the world such as the
U.S., should not be used for SIDS. Islands require policies and governance guidelines
that are specific to their characteristics. Kelman (2010), for example, claims that local
voices within communities provide the best insights into people’s interests, desires, and
perceptions(Kelman, 2010). Kelman argues that island governance towards hazards
should incorporate community-based knowledge in order for islands’ survival. His
argument stems from the fact that islands, especially those that have indigenous peoples,
have used techniques that have worked, allowing their inhabitants to survive until today.
He acknowledges that climate change carries uncertainties to which traditional local
knowledge alone cannot guarantee survival, but still thinks that it a weapon that is
underutilized.
Others agree that research is needed at the community level to obtain local
knowledge and insight. Méheux, Dominic-Howes, and Lloyd (2007) have written about
the reasons that there should be future research of island communities and natural
hazards. They explicitly say that it is a good idea for smaller-scale research – specifically
at the community level. They state that larger nations who scientists consider to be more
responsible for the increasing climate change will not focus on research and development
for SIDS because those effects that affect SIDS are not considered a threat to them
(Méheux et al., 2007). This is included in the fuller discussion about climate justice,
which states that nations responsible for climate change should be the ones that look to
reduce the impacts felt by those who are most vulnerable to climate change. In this case it
is SIDS (Baptiste & Rhiney, 2016b). In addition, these authors believe that researching
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the relationship between natural hazards and SIDS can encouraged, not only disaster
mitigation, but also sustainable development planning initiatives which can support
island livelihoods. Méheux, Dominic-Howes, and Lloyd’s article (2007) then concludes
with a recommendation of smaller-scale studies, at the community level, which identify
impacts from natural hazards, as well as weaknesses in the existing protocols, but a
comprehension of best practices of response of recovery of island communities (Scobie,
2018).

1.3 Research Question: How have SIDS responded to threats from Natural
Hazards?
As stated, small islands are expected to endure harsh impacts from natural hazards
that will increase in intensity and frequency. SIDS' environmental and economic
characteristics have the potential to make these natural hazards turn into disasters. I
believe that there must be a review of the present catastrophe protocols and preparation of
SIDS before implementing new climate change and risk mitigation policies and
recommendations. I would like to examine how SIDS perceive their risk and resilience
towards disasters and natural hazards, moreover their awareness of their situation.
Hence, my research question has three separate lines of inquiry: (1) If SIDS are
threatened continuously by these natural hazards, do they have protocols in place that can
reduce their risk? (2) Are they even aware of their vulnerability? (3) Are they prepared
for natural disasters?
Cataloging current or previous actions taken by islanders on the individual and
governmental level during a natural disaster event would be the first step to addressing
these questions. The island of Dominica, located in the Caribbean, is one of the 57
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countries classified as a SIDS. On September 18th, 2017, the island had experienced a
catastrophic event, the landfall of Hurricane Maria. The storm hit the island as a category
five on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale. The topography of the island endured hours
of 160 miles per hours winds and heavy rainfall.
This event on this island is an unfortunate, but perfect case study to answer my
research question. Thus, my thesis is an assessment of the protocol, awareness, and
preparedness of the island of Dominica before, during, and after Hurricane Maria in
September 2017.
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2 Chapter Two: The Case Study
2.1 The island of Dominica
The island of Dominica is located in the Caribbean Sea, lying in the Lesser
Antilles archipelago, between Guadeloupe to the north and Martinique to the south.
Officially named the Commonwealth of Dominica, the island is a former colonized state
of both England and France, eventually gaining its independence from the United
Kingdom’s dominion on November 3rd, 1978.
Rightfully called Waitu’kubuli meaning “tall is her body” by the island’s indigenous
Kalinago Caribs, Dominica is topographically mountainous-volcanic terrain. Its tallest
mountain is Morne Diablotin, with a peak that is 4,747 feet (1,447 meters). 70% of the
island is mountains, leaving a small fraction of land that is suitable for cultivation that
supports a society of 70,000.
Nicknamed “the nature island,” its full 290 square miles host 365 rivers, nine
volcanoes, including Boiling Lake (that is the world’s second-largest hot spring), and a
diversity of flora and fauna. The interior tropical rainforest sees over 300 inches of
rainfall a year while the coasts see only about 50 inches. On the island, the hurricane
season falls from June to November.
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2.2 Hurricane Maria and Dominica
Tropical waves off the coast of Africa were first reported on September 12th,
2017. By Saturday, September 16th, a tropical storm watch had been made for four
Leeward islands including Dominica. At 1500 UTC (3 PM), the National Hurricane
Center in Miami, Florida had sent out a forecast advisory titled “POTENTIAL
TROPICAL CYCLONE FIFTEEN FORECAST/ADVISORY NUMBER 1” stating that
the storm was to develop into a tropical storm within the next 48 hours (National
Hurricane Center, 2017). The first public advisories arrived earlier that day, around 11
AM Atlantic Standard Time. By 2 PM Atlantic Standard Time (AST), the storm was
named Maria. By this time, some islands were under a hurricane watch and others,
including Dominica, were still listed under a tropical storm watch. By 8 PM, a public
advisory from the National Hurricane Center showed that the Government of France had
issued a hurricane watch for the island of Guadeloupe to the north. Dominica was still
under a tropical storm watch until the “Tropical Storm Maria Advisory Number 4” at 5
AM Atlantic Standard time on September 17th, 2017 (National Hurricane Center, 2017).
In that advisory, the National Hurricane Center announce that, “the government of
Barbados has changed the Tropical Storm Watch for Dominica to a Hurricane Watch.”
At 9 PM AST, September 18 , 2017, Maria had made landfall on the island of
th

Dominica with maximum sustained winds up to 160 mph (Government of the
Commonwealth of Dominica, 2017) . The Saffir-Simpson scale depicts that at that wind
speed: “Catastrophic damage will occur…A high percentage of framed homes will be
destroyed, with total roof failure and wall collapse. Fallen trees and power poles will
isolate residential areas. Power outages will last for weeks to possibly months. Most of
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the area will be uninhabitable for weeks or months” (Schott et al., 2012)That was exactly
what happened, along with flashfloods and landslides. Roads were completely blocked
off, and most homes were sighted as just their foundations. It is recorded that the island
experienced 22.8 inches of rainfall. 90% of the roofs had considerable damage. 31 people
were pronounced dead, with 37 were reported missing. It is estimated that the damages
will cost the island $1.37 billion. (Assessment Capacities Project, 2018). The following
figure (Pasch, Penny, & Berg, 2018) and photographs below depict the hurricane path
and the damage that it caused to the island.
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Figure 2 The full path of Hurricane Maria from September with colored lines represent intensity in
the Caribbean region.
Magenta signifies that it had strength of a category 5 and 4 on the Saffir-Simpson Scale. Red is
category 3 and lower on the scale. Yellow and green show Maria as tropical disturbances in the
weather. The closeup insert shows Maria passes over two islands: Dominica and Puerto Rico at high
pressure and wind speed. Captioned “Best track positions for Hurricane Maria, 16–30 September
2017. Track during the extratropical stage is partially based on analyses from the NOAA Ocean
Prediction Center.” Hurricane Maria 16-30 September 2017[Map]. Pasch et. al, (2018)
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL152017_Maria.pdf
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Photographs 1 (top) and 2 (bottom) - Heavy rainfall caused landslide. These images show a large boulder
blocking the main road that connects the northeast of the country to the capital of Roseau. Communication
efforts become troubled when the only way to and from the certain areas of the country is compromised.
The size of the boulder can be scaled to reference by the people standing in the photos. The water pictured
is the Caribbean Sea. These images were taken a month after Maria made landfall and depict the difficulty
of recovering to damage. Source: Used with permission of photographer, Anthony Lawrence October
26, 2017.
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Photographs 3 (top) and 4 (bottom) – Houses had considerable damage. These images show the amount of
damage caused by powerful winds and rainfall. Hurricane Maria was able to rip the roofs and walls off of
90% of the houses in Dominica. Many homes were left with just their foundations (top). Streets were
littered with debris and left there for months after (bottom). Many islanders will have to build their homes
from scratch during the recovery period. Source: Used with permission of photographer, Anthony
Lawrence October 22, 2017.
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Photographs 5 (top) and 6 (bottom) – River communities were exposed to more danger. Most communities
are most likely to be in close quarters of one of the 365 rivers within Dominica. Heavy rainfall dumped in
the watersheds of the mountains during the Maria caused rivers, tributaries, and streams to increase in flow.
It also sent large pieces of debris and trees to slow downstream. This natural phenomenon threatened
riparian communities to experience land subsidence, flooding, and mudslides. Source: Used with
permission of photographer, Anthony Lawrence October 22, 2017.
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2.3 Hurricane David and Dominica
Hurricane Maria was not the first of its magnitude to be experienced by the island
of Dominica. On August 29 , 1979, Category 4 Hurricane David made a direct path over
th

the southern part of the country. That area, which included the capital of Roseau, felt
colossal damage from the maximum sustained winds of 125 knots (143 mph). The island
experienced a great loss of the crops of their biggest exports at the time, bananas and
coconuts. The storm is on record as dumping 10 inches of added rainfall to the island’s
interior resulting in landslides and flooding in some areas. It is archived that David
damaged approximately 80% of the homes. About 60,000 people were left homeless,
which was nearly 80% of the total population of the island at that time. 56 people died
and 180 were injured. The observation of the neighborhoods on the island is likened to
devastation after an air raid (Hebert, 1980).

2.4 Differences between Hurricanes David (1979) and Maria (2018)
Firstly, the path of the eye of David was through the middle of the south of the
island. Maria’s eye path was straight through the center of the island. During the recovery
period of David, the north was able to carry on business as usual quicker and supply help
to the south of the island. Secondly, David crossed over the island in the daytime during
the middle of the week, which meant that people were more likely to get supplies and
prepare themselves for the upcoming storm starting Monday during usual business hours.
Maria’s full force appeared during a Sunday night when most people were already
indoors, and shopping for supplies was tough due to weekend business hours. Lastly,
David was said to produce more damage by wind while Maria was described as a “wet”
storm, meaning it had more water-related costs on top of massive wind damage.
18

3 Chapter Three: Methods
In order to examine a case in which SIDS responded to threats from natural hazards,
I narrowed the geographic area to the island of Dominica. To assess Dominica’s capacity,
I recruited 15 participants for interviews. I chose these individuals using the snowballing
sampling technique in which one initial participant was used as a basis for recruiting
other participants in the sample. All 15 participants had lived on the island of Dominica
for most of their lives. 14 out of 15 participants have livelihoods within the country’s
capital of Roseau. Their occupations and careers varied (Table 1).
Table 1 Breakdown of Participants' Occupations
Economic Sector
Agriculture
Community Development
Education
Law Enforcement
Public Administration
Religion
Tourism

# of Participants (n=15)
1
3
3
2
3
1
2

Only one participant was not present on the island when Hurricane Maria made
landfall. The 14 others were on the island frm September 16 -20, 2017, during Hurricane
Maria. The remaining participant was in the vicinity of the Caribbean and returned to the
island during the recovery period. All 15 participants have some knowledge of the
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characteristics of the response and recovery efforts during and after Hurricane David in
1979.
I conducted interviews over the telephone and in person. These interviews were
conducted after review by Binghamton University’s institutional review board (IRB) for
interacting with human subjects. This study established each participants’ full consent,
given verbally, recorded with a mobile phone application. Identifying characteristics of
the participants such as names were not documented. Instead, general occupational
identifiers were given for analysis and organization of this study.
I formulated interview questions using the literature as well as news reports in the
immediate aftermath of Hurricane Maria. I organized these questions into six focus areas:
(1) communication; (2) community vs. institutional actions; (3) community knowledge;
(4) security (and the action of looting); (5) social justice; and (6) resiliency. Questions for
each of these focus areas in unification help piece together an assessment of the
protocols, awareness, and preparedness of the island of Dominica during Hurricane
Maria.
I scheduled each interview for 25 minutes, in which participants relayed answers
to the questions. Interviews were recorded with a mobile phone application. Recorded
interviews amounted to 13 hours, 52 minutes, and 15 seconds in total. Only one
participant did not give permission for their interview to be recorded. That interview was
approximately 15 minutes.
There were multiple limitations to this study. One was finding documents from
the island of Dominica, which does not have a comprehensive official database. Materials
online are limited to those documents, laws, and news reports that are digitized and
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accessible online. Another limitation of this study is that research was conducted five
months after a catastrophe, so assessments of this report were compiled while recovery
efforts were ongoing. Finding supplementary resources as well as a larger sample for the
study was made harder by the catastrophe. Telecommunication was also problematic.
Since the island was experiencing problems with electricity, cold calling certain people to
ask if they would like to be interviewed proved difficult.
It is understood that the Snowball technique for creating a sample of participants
poses a problem in controlling for a plethora of like-minded individuals. To control for
this while retaining variance in the sample, I asked two participants who gave me
contrasting answers to the study’s questions to recommend and recruit other potential
participants that they knew. The small number of the sample is recognized.
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4 Chapter Four: Results of the Study
Answers to the interview questions are summarized below. All of the responses that I
acquired were coded for content and analyzed into six focus areas described in the
previous section.

4.1 Communication
4.1.1 Medium and accuracy
Participants said they were accustomed to following messages announced on the
national broadcasting radio stations and television weather channels. 70% of respondents
all mentioned two mediums by name: Dominica Broadcasting Station (DBS) and the
Weather Channel. Through these means, all the participants said they were aware of an
upcoming storm within the region. Everyone said they were tracking the storm for
multiple days before it made its path towards Dominica.

4.1.2 Timing
Every participant believed that each time an alert or update was issued was
extremely important. On average, updates about a tropical cyclone is given every 6 hours
by the National Hurricane Center. This time includes a reconnaissance aircraft to fly into
the storm and collect information such as position and wind speed. They then use this

22

information to calculate a “best track,” plotting a path showing 6-hour intervals. In the
case of Maria, any 6-hour update felt more like a delay. This storm was moving at such a
fast pace that new incoming information was inaccurate. Public advisories by the
National Hurricane Center were given every three hours after September 16th, and after
5PM September 18 , updates were given every few minutes, according to the center’s
th

Hurricane Maria Advisory Archive (Landsea & Lawrence, 2004).

4.1.3 Messages Communicated by Non-Experts
Participants concurred that information about the upcoming storm was provided by a
mixture of people. Most of the participants said that the messages over the radio were
given by radio personalities and national officials. This means the message of hurricane
safety and updates about the storm was not given by weather experts or meteorologists.
As suggested by The Introduction to Emergency Management handbook, the messenger
is important. The sense of urgency about the storm was not given since the information
was provided neither by someone who understands the science nor by someone of
authority in emergency situations who could effectively present the harsh and honest
depiction of what was to be expected in a way the general public would understand.
One participant suggested that the radio dialogue was “too jargon-y and needed
layman’s language on the radio.” That same participant felt that communication generally
could have been “more on the ground” and also “…[given] in Kwéyòl.”

1

Kwéyòl is an additional language that is spoken on the island besides the official language of English. It is
a French-based Patois, tied to the history and culture of the plantation slaves in the earlier 17 and 18
centuries; bits and pieces can be heard in everyday conversations (Government of Dominica, 2018)
1
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4.1.4 Social Media and Rumors
People used cellphones and tablets to browse social media platforms for information
about the storms as well as radio and television. Information on social media can be false,
edited, or not updated altogether. Rumors—or unverified, distortions of information—are
problematic when ecological and human safety are at stake for accurate and timely
information.
“WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram. That is just the mode of the day.
Easiest form. Everyone has a cell phone.”

4.1.5 Frequency of storms lowered seriousness of situation
Maria was a storm that followed many Atlantic storms that hurricane season. On
average, six hurricanes develop a year. Complacency may occur when the island
community is exposed to natural hazards repeatedly (Pelling & Uitto, 2001; Sheets,
1990) . People’s individual response to warnings, watches, and updates are then
situational based on perception. A few participants said that others anticipated their
survival by either claiming they could get through Maria since they had already
gotten through David, or by using religious preconception, such as “it’s God’s will”.
The majority of the island follows some version of Christianity (Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2017).
“Everyone said ‘I survived that David, I can survive this’ pre-Maria,
and prepared as normal. After they said, ‘This is nothing like
David’.”

4.2 Community Actions vs Institutional Actions
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4.2.1 Recognized lead agency and official disaster plan
Everyone interviewed named the ODM as the lead agency during emergency
situations. According to the 2001 National Disaster Plan, the National Emergency
Planning Organization (NEPO), chaired by the PM, is technically the lead agency, whose
job it is to oversee a National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC). It is stated in the
plan that authority is then passed on to the ODM, which is why the ODM is perceived as
the lead agency (National Emergency Planning Organization, 2001). However, the
authorities and boundaries are not sufficiently explained such that it is not clear if the
ODM has the explicit authority to make executive decisions in an emergency situation.

Photograph 7 - The Office of Disaster Management, located in the town of Jimmit, Mahaut,
Dominica. The ODM is the island’s listed emergency management operation agency. They are
required by to operate a National Emergency Operations Center by law. Source: Author

“ODM has responsibilities but no authority. No law to give them
power.”
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4.2.2 Delegation of tasks
It seems as though the delegation of tasks were given out flippantly by the PM
and other executive officials and consequently, people felt like there they saw more of the
PM than the ODM. They knew efforts were being made by the ODM, but it was not seen
as on the ground, controlling the situation.
“PM more visible… ODM kind of got lost in the hours and days
after.”

4.2.3 Community members possess same qualities and resources as leading
agencies
Participants said that these key leaders could just as easily have distributed materials and
resources, offered their equipment, and volunteered their manpower and life-saving
skills. People sensed there could have been more delegation and responsibilities given to
key community leaders and shelter managers during the event. Some pronounced that
community members went as far as housing those who were displaced.
“Key leaders in the community would help…distribute resources”.

4.3 Community Knowledge
4.3.1 Parents instilled survival and communities shared knowledge
All participants said they were taught by family members about what to do during a
hurricane. Many more added that their communities were the ones that taught them
additional knowledge. Together, they felt as though the neighbors watched over the
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survival of others, which was essential for preparedness and the key to successful
response and recovery.
“My father taught me things at home. What to do before the
hurricane season, so on and so forth. And then I watched the
different families on our street do the same thing. I watched parents
talk about who has what… they kind of used to do inventories of who
has what tools… My father was the keeper of that. Other people
had… like a neighbor, he was into radio… So, they knew what the
strengths of each other was, so they didn’t have to be searching… If
someone was cut, we knew where the nurse was. We didn’t have to
search or wait around for the hospitals…That’s the power of local
knowledge.

4.3.2 No drills in school
Most of the participants said that they do recall learning about climate and extreme
changes in weather but never how to respond to hurricanes. It was mentioned that the
Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) sometimes host
workshops for children within the months before and during the summer months. Some
said that as adults, having drills depended on the workplace but still nothing was truly
mandatory.
“They hardly had drills.”

4.3.3 Past generations versus new generations
It was expressed that generations differed in survival preparedness. Unprepared older
generations were said to have justified their lax preparation due to the fact that they had
survived Hurricane David. Some believed the majority of the newer generations
(referencing young parents) were busy with occupations and white-collar careers, so they
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did not show their children mitigative techniques as was done in previous generations.
They expressed that the value of “koudmen” was missing (Crosbie, Frank, Leon, &
Samuel, 2001) . Koudmen is a Kwéyòl word that means a help, free work day, or a group
work project. The word was expressed multiple times in the interviews. Participants said
that people were not as willing to lend a helping hand in the neighborhood. Their
reasoning was that the society of younger generations are exposed to new gadgets,
technology and a global economy. It was considered that the children of the island were
more excited to see the event of the storm than be prepared and take it as a serious lifethreatening event.

4.4 Security (and the action of looting)
4.4.1 Burglary of non-survival items
People looting non-essential items angered many of the participants. Many of them
identified the island’s youth as people who made looting into a political, economic, and
social protest instead of it being about survival. Participants said that they saw looters
break into buildings and offices and take items needed for businesses. Such items
included bulky household items like furniture and appliances, office equipment, and
computer systems. The participants said that the behavior should not have been accepted
as looting, but as stealing, which is a punishable crime.
“On the other hand, I saw people carrying fridges and stoves… I saw
them stacked at their house… I saw stacks of washing machines in
cardboard boxes untouched in their front yard…This is looting, and
this is unforgiveable, and this is wrong, and I condemn it to the
highest degree. A man feeding his family and he comes to a business
place and he take some sugar and some rice and some flour, milk…
and he brings it to his family. I don’t call that looting.”
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Photograph 8 - Burglary masked as looting. This image shows a solar street lamp whose battery and
transformer has been taken. These street lamps are property of the island’s government and spread
throughout the coastline. It was believed that the battery was stolen from the base of the lamp, which
was secured with concrete and bolts, as shown in the picture. Survivors needed special tools to open
that compartment. The solar battery and transformer produces electricity. Source: Author

4.4.2 Impact of looting and burglary
The participants were afraid that the looting incident was going to cause economic
instability. They explained that businesses and offices left unscathed by the hurricane
were broken into, and valuable items were destroyed or stolen. Many of them blamed
this action on uncertainties of the Dominican economy and job market. Most believed
that certain industries like tourism and agriculture will not recover. They said that
unemployment before the hurricane was already a pressing issue in society, and the
actions of looters exacerbated it. They highly believed that those who are unemployed
will leave the island, and a large migration of residents will lead to less productivity, thus
a continued cycle of crime within society. They further predicted that a large emigration
will cause businesses to hike up prices of items for customers. Scarcity of food and
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building materials for homes, as well as higher taxes, are feared results of an unstable
market.
Participants said there would be a loss of trust in youth. They revealed that they do
not believe the youth will bring positive change. They fear losing a sense of community.
Some said they were afraid to leave their homes in case someone tried to steal from them.
Some feared being murdered. All participants said that the social well-being of survivors
of the hurricanes will be affected. Depression and other psychosocial emotions were
mentioned to be highly rampant within society because of the mass trauma caused by the
hurricane and looting situation.

4.4.3 Looting rooted in political reasons regarding economic and social issues
Participants tried to explain the anger of the youth. In some way or another, all 15
participants hinted at the government being responsible for creating feelings of alienation
and injustice among the younger generation. They explained it as young adults taking
what they believed should have been provided to them through government programs. It
was not necessarily that economic advantages are not given to people of the island, but
that some get more than others. Favoritism by the government for its political supporters
was mentioned frequently in the interviews. Participants said that it was a major problem
for the island by exposing their personal experiences. However, this should not be
considered as definitive proof. The true extent of partisanship is very difficult to prove
based on personal experiences from a limited sample size, and so this tension is not
further explored in the study.
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“This is not an issue about law enforcement. To me, this is an issue
about national rage. This is about people being upset about the time.
This is about the last days. People feeling, again, this ‘Pray to God
and he will save you from the hurricane’ moment and you are not
saved. This is about a rage of economic disparity. Access to things. It
has everything to do with an economic and social reality. About
economic difference and inequality. So, to frame looting as problem
of security is to miss the point… It is a direct result of the culture of
dependency…And this was a way of enacting, them saying ‘Waiting
for people to take care of me didn’t work. I’m going to take
something for myself…. I’m so frustrated.’”

4.4.4 Law enforcement was overwhelmed
The main period of looting was cited as lasting 5-6 days. People were concerned
about why the police took so long to act. Participants said that security was an
overwhelming task for law enforcement. It was explained that there is no military force in
Dominica. According to the Police Act Chapter 14:01, the police force shall be employed
as a military force “in defense of the State” (Government of Dominica, 1991; Red de
Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina, 2010). This happened in the case of Hurricane
Maria. The police force was called to action during the storm and immediately after.
Some participants said infrastructural damages based on the magnitude and destruction of
the storm, such as blocked roads, weakened the capacity of law enforcement to act
efficiently. Some participants also recognized that the police force might have been
worrying about their families and homes, distracting them from acting quickly to
situations. One participant said that it was unacceptable for this to be an excuse when it
came to the looting.
It was mentioned that there was a lack of police leadership. This entailed that there
was a lack of clear instructions, and the police force did not want to act towards looters in
a way that would have created future lawsuits. Additionally, there was the fact that the
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police force recognized the looters as people of their own communities or even family
members. External military forces from other countries helping with recovery efforts do
not have the mindset that looters are people they are close to. This enabled these forces to
take more brute actions towards looters.
Many also said the state of emergency was declared too late. Curfews were not issued
or enforced until days after the storm. Participants believed that this would have
controlled the situation better.

Photograph 9 – Pictured are external forces coming from the sea to villages and communities cut
off from the rest of the island. Source: Used with permission of photographer, Anthony Lawrence

“You have a responsibility when you belong to an organization like
that to maintain law and order at any cost. And I don’t think they
were prepared either for that level of disaster… When it came to
implementation, the reality, there was a complete breakdown of
security… Even the looters… The Jamaicans [forces] were the ones
shooting people in their foot because the local policemen said they
weren’t shooting anybody… everybody in Dominica related…what
happens when you see your cousin looting?... So that is something
that has to be looked at because if this happens again, what do we
do? …They were totally overwhelmed and overstretched.”
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4.5 Social Justice
When asked if anyone was left out of potential resiliency plans, various groups
were named, including the unemployed, displaced, aging, and children. These groups
were considered to be the most vulnerable because they either had no money or were not
educated enough on how to change their lifestyles to support resilience.
“The other thing about hurricanes is that you receive the advice…
both at the farm level and household level, it is a financial issue,
whether or not the individual has the capacity to do what needs to be
done… I think that at the individual level that is a major setback.
People know what to do but they might not be in a position to do it.”

Photograph 10 – Hurricane Ties. This image shows the use of hurricane ties (the black twisted
materials on the wooden beams) on the roof of the Fort Young Hotel in Roseau. They are used to
secure the roof if heavy wind is threatening to uplift it. A participant acknowledged that they were
unaware that this was a tool they can install in their own house before a hurricane until they
discovered it in someone else’s home and asked about it. They described it as a pricey material and
that it can be unaffordable to have a contractor install it in other’s homes. This scenario shows how
knowledge can be spread through the community level and how advice is given but individuals are not
always able to follow it. Source: Author
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4.5.1 Men and the working poor
Two answers were particularly interesting: men and the working poor. The
reasons that these two were left out can be explained by the direct quotes below.
“But everything in response to Maria and even before Maria has to
do with women. Single women. Single mother. Women with children
under 12 [years of age]. What about the men? The whole packaging
of everything has kind of sidelined the men… in a systematic way….
Be equitable. Be gender non-biased… There is a disparity. And we
are underestimating the impact of this in the overall resilience of the
society.”
“I say [the working poor] are left out because they cannot move from
where they are. They are fixed. They are immobile…economically…
materially…. This is not people who are sitting out there waiting for a
handout. Necessarily, they are not on the block, but certainly have
some social problems created by exhaustion…. Making sure they
meet the needs of their family. There are so many families like this
who get left out because they are not poor enough… Some of them
are literally starting over from scratch.”

4.6 Resiliency

4.6.1

Resiliency believed to lie in the hands of agriculture and tourism

As with previous generations, the livelihoods of the people are heavily dependent
on the land and sea of and around the island, in the forms of agriculture and tourism. It
would be very devastating for society if people were unable to go back to those sectors in
which their livelihoods prospered and make these feel as though they never recovered
from Hurricane Maria. This has everything to do with identity and sense of place.
Agriculture and tourism are not necessarily the only ways of getting communities back to
how they were before the storm but are ways for people of the island to begin feeling
optimistic for the future. Other proponents of this question say that they would like
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sustainability and resilience to be continued topics of conversation for many years to
come. They would like to see Government and government officials to promise to
maintain these conversations, to enforce sustainable practices and protocols, and meet
sustainable goals. They would like to see Dominica be the first island community and
Caribbean SID to reach a level of resilience that other SIDS look towards for precedents,
inspiration, courage, and strength.
“We cannot move the beach.”

Photograph 11 – This image shows how close the communities are to the
coastline of the beach. Pictured is the western side of the island touching the
Caribbean Sea. Communities will have to decide either to continue living in areas
that are exposed to the threats of natural hazards or move. Source: Author

“You will hear fancy words. We love to sound pretty. We cannot stand
to what we preach.”
35

Photograph 12 – This image shows a cruise ship docked in Roseau on January 28, 2018. The German
boat Mein Schiff 3 was the first tourists’ ship to arrive on the island after Hurricane Maria in 2017. Its
arrival was fully anticipated by many, especially the Tourism sector. Source: Author
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5 Chapter Five: Conclusion
Communication efforts were proven to be difficult before and during the event.
Participants’ medium of choice to get updates on upcoming storms was local radio and
the Weather Channel. Participants agreed that local radio personnel was usually the ones
to relay messages of official meteorological information. They also looked to social
media through cellphones and mobile tablets to obtain and spread messages to others.
About half the participants felt that information about the storm was given to the public
in a timely matter thus allowing enough time to prepare. The rest did not believe the
information was accurate or timely. Four out of 15 believed that other forms of
communication were better than the norm, such as air sirens or SMS messages from
telecommunication providers. Complacency toward regular exposure to hurricanes within
June through November was blamed as a reason for inadequate preparedness of the
island. The fact that Maria’s course was strengthening and setting a direct path for the
island at the beginning of the week was also blamed.
All the participants named one agency as the lead agency: The Office of Disaster
Management (ODM). They said their primary responsibility is to coordinate the response
and recovery efforts. It concurred that the office of the Prime Minister (PM) was more
visible than the ODM during and after the hurricane. They believe that leadership and the
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ability to allocate resources are an essential quality for the lead agency in disaster
situations and that it is possible some community members possess that same quality.
A majority of the participants said they learned hurricane mitigative and survival
techniques from family members from a past tropical storm. They concurred that there
were no official drills in primary or secondary school. Some survived the catastrophe of
Hurricane David in 1979 and used acquired lessons and knowledge from that experience
towards this hurricane. Participants said that Hurricane Maria was most likely the first of
its kind to be experienced by a large percentage of the younger population. They noted
that reconstruction of the island after David would be more different than Maria’s
because of storm characteristics and community value differences. They expressed that a
mix of local community knowledge with new technology and information about response
and recovery was best for infusing resilience into the island.
All participants said that looting is a normal post-disaster reaction. The most
common items looted are usually food, water, clothing, and shelter materials. Participants
revealed that people began stealing and fighting over other items, such as electronics,
from stores that had survived the hurricane. The week-long burglary of businesses from
the country’s capital of Roseau was said to have tremendous socioeconomic impacts.
Participants believed that businesses would never reopen, leaving many people
unemployed after reconstruction. They expressed that strong kinship of communities and
trust in others were destroyed. As the previous section explained, many of the younger
populations had never seen a disaster of this magnitude. Some participants believed that it
was mostly this younger generation that had partaken in this reckless behavior. All
participants understood looting as younger generations acting on their grievances toward
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socioeconomic injustices imposed on them by the government. They also expressed that
limitations of law enforcement could not control the situation appropriately.
Various groups were named as having difficulty to becoming resilient: the
unemployed, displaced, aging, and children. Men and the working poor were two groups
specifically mentioned. Every single person interviewed understood that resilience was
about self-preparedness in the sense that they can overcome trauma and disasters. Eight
participants realized that it meant fixing problems within society: fixing the political
structures in place, refocusing livelihood towards agriculture, putting the land first, etc.
Some participants still felt as though fixing the economy was the best method for
resiliency. They considered agriculture and tourism the most important sectors to get
things back to normalcy. Overall, they felt like they would support any measures to
continue resiliency efforts in Dominica after Hurricane Maria.
My research opened up a channel to a multitude of opportunities to study SIDS,
island vulnerability, climate change, and sustainable development. The next step of this
research would be to recommend policies for individuals, businesses, governments, and
nongovernment organizations that can reduce risks from natural hazards. This study can
be extended into finding, collecting and archiving more traditional survival techniques
embedded in communities and generations, such as stories and folklore. Another step to
this research can be a study that looks into the total impacts of increased amounts of
rainfall on islands with large percentages of rainforest ecosystems.
To conclude, a significant amount of factors challenged how well the island of
Dominica can respond and recover from this natural disaster. It is visible that the
Government of Dominica has a known protocol for island response to natural hazards and
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disasters. The National Emergency Planning Organization’s National Disaster Plan of
2001 is a published disaster plan. When transferring these plans into reality, however, it
appears that there can be a multitude of problems that decrease success.
The framework created for these emergency plans is a top-down policy. The
actions listed in the plan are to task responsibilities assigned to specific government
officials, secretaries, and offices. Based on the interviews with the 15 participants, there
is a potential for community-based information and knowledge to be integrated into the
national disaster plans. The participants survived Hurricane Maria by following the
advice of the government and emergency management officials as well as using past
experiences to protect themselves during the storm. This finding suggests it is beneficial
to use a mixture of both local community knowledge and advice from top officials. Thus,
a collaboration between internal island specialists within communities and external
researchers can maximize the potential of creating a bank of past, current, and future
natural hazard reduction techniques for island communities. Such a collaboration would
be satisfying the proponents of climate justice for SIDS.
Furthermore, the top-down protocol framework has caused participants to indicate
that there is strong political partisanship within society. Whether general policies of
politically influential leaders strengthen partisanship or not was an inquiry of this study.
What this study inquired was about the abilities of key leaders of SIDS to govern during
disasters. What was revealed is that leaders are in positions to create hesitation and
ambivalence of community members, which affected natural hazard awareness and
response to hurricanes. The fact that there is any mistrust of government officials,
emergency managers, police force, and information from administrative officials is
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problematic. In combination with managing risk, all leaders of the country should have
the ability to transform the attitudes of the islanders so that they feel they can survive
potential forthcoming disasters.
In contrast, it is not acceptable for leaders to infer that the Government is the endall to surviving natural hazards. In the case of Dominica and Hurricane Maria, people
waited for the Government to tell them what to do and give them resources pre- and poststorm. It should be recognized that there is a difference between governance and
government. “Governance refers to actions, processes, and systems creating, evolving,
and monitoring rules and regulations by which people function within society.
Government refers to the bodies that are charged with formalizing and enforcing
governance” (Kelman, 2015). It is imperative that the island’s individuals understand the
distinction.
This belief that government should freely give resources is called handout
mentality (Ambang, 2018). Handout mentality occurs when political organizations do
whatever they can to please the majority of people who have pledged allegiance to their
party. Once in power, a political administration’s first order of business is to fulfill
election promises. Most political leaders do this by giving free handouts of resources to
their voters. Distributing supplies to some communities and citizens marginalizes others.
In the minds of the others, it is unfair for a newly elected government to give out
resources to constituents. As implied by the participants of this study, this causes
frustration and rage in those who have this mentality. In the case of Dominica, the youth
are most susceptible to this way of thinking and tried to correct it by taking what was not
given to them but seen given to others. The act of stealing items after the storm was then
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enshrouded by the natural action of looting post-disaster. Overall, it led to minimal
preparedness and self-governance of particular individuals during the event of Hurricane
Maria.
In the case of awareness, individuals of SIDS must not become complacent,
especially since climate change is going to produce storms of higher magnitudes and
frequencies. The experiences of Dominicans during Hurricane Maria should not be
forgotten. The participants of the study believe experiences will not be overlooked.
However, searching for lessons learned 30 years ago after Hurricane David during this
study attested the potential for this to happen. It must be recognized that generations will
always be exposed to changes in society, which may cause loss of lessons, values,
traditions, and knowledge as time goes on. It is important to archive them in history
books so that they can always be used as a reference. It is even better to instill those
lessons within in policies or laws and enforce them so that they are obeyed and followed.
Lastly, the island of Dominica and all SIDS should recognize that preparedness is
cyclic. Shortfalls of a plan should continually be assessed after training, simulations, and
exercises. The individuals, officials, and businesses of Dominica should not take
preparedness as a linear progression. Hazards are not limited to happening one at a time,
where a particular step can be made to mitigate it, and then move on to respond to
another. They can occur at the same time, in different forms, and preparedness is about
being able to respond to all of it. When it comes to survival to natural disasters, excuses
are intolerable. Preparing oneself for unknown difficulties is challenging, but resilience is
how well we can return to normal after going through those difficulties. To have the
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capacity to do so means learning from mistakes. My research displays those mistakes and
displays them as the first step to reaching sustainability in communities.

“We have info…but don’t use it.”
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Appendix
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Informed Consent
Principal Investigator: Keanna N Julien
Title of Project: Protocol, awareness, and preparedness evaluation of Dominica during Hurricane
Maria: SIDS’ challenges to resiliency and adaptation to climate change
Purpose of the Study
You are invited to participate in a research study of Dominica during Hurricane Maria. I hope to
learn about issues of emergency management and governance during this hydro-meteorological
event for small island developing states that must adapt to climate change. You were selected as
a possible participant in this study because you lived on the island at the time of the event. You
must be over the age of 18 and have been living on the island for at least 4 to 12 months before
September 19th, 2017 to participate. There are approximately 20 subjects expected to be
involved in the study.
Description of Study Procedures
If you decide to participate, I will conduct one interview with you over the phone, which should
take about 25 minutes to one hour. The interview will be recorded with a device used for
recollection and analysis later. You will have to relive or recollect actions during a particularly
stressful and/ or terrifying event which may disrupt your peace of mind or state of relaxation. This
discomfort will be mitigated by keeping the thought of recollection short, under one-minute long.
You are free to skip any questions that you are not comfortable with responding to.
Potential Risks
There is no more than minimal risk involved in this study. Although there are no foreseeable risks
involved in the study, you may skip any questions you may feel uncomfortable with and/or
withdraw from the study at any time.
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Potential Benefits
There are no direct benefits to participating in this study. I cannot and do not guarantee or
promise that you will receive any direct benefits from this study.
Alternative Procedures
There are no known alternative procedures. The only alternative is not to participate.
Confidentiality and Access to Records
Your name will not appear in this study. There will be generalized identifiers used. The records of
this study and recordings will be kept for three years in audio format in a password protected
online drive. This drive is not cloud-based. After three years the records from this study will be
destroyed. The research will remain confidential unless we are required by New York State Law
to report harm to yourself or your children.
Voluntary Nature and Withdrawal
Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your relations with the investigators,
Binghamton University. Your participation is completely voluntary. If you decide to participate, you
are free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at any time without any penalty.
Any significant new findings developed during the research that may affect your willingness to
continue participation will be provided to you promptly.
Questions and Contact Information
Before you sign the form, please ask questions on any aspect of the study that is unclear to you.
If you have any additional questions, concerns, or complaints or wish to report a research-related
problem later, Keanna N Julien at kjulien1@binghamton.edu will be happy to answer them. If at
any time you have questions concerning your rights as a research subject, or you have questions,
concerns, or complaints about the research, you may contact Binghamton University's Human
Subjects Research Review Committee (HSRRC) at (607) 777-3818 or hsrrc@binghamton.edu.
Do I have your permission to record the interview?

Date ____________
Consent to record given: YES/ NO
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YOU ARE MAKING A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO PARTICIPATE. YOUR SIGNATURE
INDICATES THAT YOU HAVE DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE HAVING READ THE
INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOVE.

Date ____________
Verbal consent given: YES/ NO
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Keanna N Julien
Interview Script
STUDY TITLE: Protocol, awareness, and preparedness evaluation of Dominica during
Hurricane Maria: SIDS’ challenges to resiliency and adaption to climate change
Do I have your permission to record the interview?
SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTS
1. Please briefly describe your account of Hurricane Maria. Please include when
and how you first heard of the storm, your immediate plan or thought of action/s,
and then a summarized description of the conditions after the storm.
COMMUNICATION
2. Can you go more into depth about the alert system? How is it customarily
communicated that there will be a natural event in which you should prepare a
plan of action for safety and resiliency? Who usually informs the public?
2a. How do you feel towards the warnings? How did you feel towards the alarm
about the upcoming storm of Maria? Why did you respond this way?
2b. Do you think that the information given to you is adequate? Would you like to
receive more information, or receive that information in another way?
2c. What form/s of communication about natural events and disaster
preparedness would you believe be the most effective, meaning most of the
public gets a clear message promptly? Why?
COMMUNITY versus INSTITUTIONS
3. What or who is in charge during a natural event? Can you name them, or
generalize what they do?
3a. What or who took the lead during Hurricane Maria? Why do you think that is?
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3b. What kind of qualities and resources should the lead person or group have in
this situation? Why are those qualities and resources essential?
3c. Do you think members of your community possess those qualities? Do you
think they could do the same job, maybe even better? Why/Why not?
COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE
4. How did you learn what to do during a hurricane/flooding/landslide? Are there
drills in school or the community? Did someone in your family teach you what to
do?
èHow many natural disasters have you lived through?
4*. Hurricane David was in late August of 1979. How was that experience?
4a*. What are some striking differences between David and Maria?
4b*. How was reconstruction after David? What was new? (houses, buildings,
government)?
4c*. What were some lessons learned from Hurricane David?
4d. Do you think people used those lessons learned from previous natural
disasters?
SECURITY
5. I heard looting was a significant problem after the storm. Why do you think
people began to loot?
5a. In what ways do you think that looting will have a long-lasting impact on the
resiliency of the country? Economic, social-wellbeing, portfolio for investors?
5b. What actions do you think could have prevented it?
SOCIAL JUSTICE
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6. Do you think there is groups or individuals in the community that are forgotten?
In what ways do you think they are being left out?
6a. How should they be included in the resiliency plan?
RESILIENCY
7. In your own words, define resilience.
7a. What would be resiliency, economically?
7b. What would resiliency, social?
7c. What would be resiliency, environmentally?
7d. Is one of those scenarios more critical than the other? Why or why not?
7e. What do you believe is the number one thing holding back from a quick and
resilient future?
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